This book offers a definitive and wide-ranging overview of developments in behavioral finance over the past ten years. In 1993, the first volume provided the standard reference to this new approach in finance--an approach that, as editor Richard Thaler put it, "entertains the possibility that some of the agents in the economy behave less than fully rationally some of the time." Much has changed since then. Not least, the bursting of the Internet bubble and the subsequent market decline further demonstrated (...) that financial markets often fail to behave as they would if trading were truly dominated by the fully rational investors who populate financial theories. Behavioral finance has made an indelible mark on areas from asset pricing to individual investor behavior to corporate finance, and continues to see exciting empirical and theoretical advances. Advances in Behavioral Finance, Volume II constitutes the essential new resource in the field. It presents twenty recent papers by leading specialists that illustrate the abiding power of behavioral finance--of how specific departures from fully rational decision making by individual market agents can provide explanations of otherwise puzzling market phenomena. As with the first volume, it reaches beyond the world of finance to suggest, powerfully, the importance of pursuing behavioral approaches to other areas of economic life. The contributors are Brad M. Barber, Nicholas Barberis, Shlomo Benartzi, John Y. Campbell, Emil M. Dabora, Daniel Kent, François Degeorge, Kenneth A. Froot, J. B. Heaton, David Hirshleifer, Harrison Hong, Ming Huang, Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Josef Lakonishok, Owen A. Lamont, Roni Michaely, Terrance Odean, Jayendu Patel, Tano Santos, Andrei Shleifer, Robert J. Shiller, Jeremy C. Stein, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Richard H. Thaler, Sheridan Titman, Robert W. Vishny, Kent L. Womack, and Richard Zeckhauser. (shrink)

The problem I shall discuss is What reason have we for believing that there are physical objects? My purpose is not either to raise or to dispel doubts as to the existence of physical objects; this doubt constitutes a medical rather than a philosophical problem. The point of asking the question is that, while there can be no reasonable difference of opinion as to whether there are physical objects, there can be and is reasonable difference of opinion as to how (...) the notion of a physical object is to be analysed; and if we are clear as to what grounds there are for believing in physical objects, we shall also be clearer as to what sort of physical objects we have grounds for believing in. Also, it is worth while to inquire which other beliefs are logically connected with, and which are logically independent of, the belief in physical objects. (shrink)

Branner, H.C. Humanismens krise.--Hansen, Martin A. Eneren og massen.

Both Carnap and Quine made significant contributions to the philosophy of mathematics despite their diversedviews. Carnap endorsed the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic knowledge and classified certainmathematical questions as internal questions appealing to logic and convention. On the contrary, Quine wasopposed to the analytic-synthetic distinction and promoted a holistic view of scientific inquiry. The purpose of thispaper is to argue that in light of the recent advancement of experimental mathematics such as Monte Carlosimulations, limiting mathematical inquiry to the domain of (...) logic is unjustified. Robustness studies implemented inMonte Carlo Studies demonstrate that mathematics is on par with other experimental-based sciences. (shrink)

Deinde qui minus grauis esset iis senectus, si octingentesimum annum agerent quam [si] octogesimum ? This sentence has to do with people who complain that the evils of old age have come upon them all too soon. Cicero rejoins that they would be of exactly the same mind, even though they had a life ten times as long to look back upon.

RESUMENUn intento por comprender la realidad sociopolítica podría consistir en situarse entre posiciones que marcan polos opuestos en el espectro de las ideas. Desde la filosofía griega se conocen las bondades y desventajas de colocarse en puntos intermedios que se hallan entre actitudes extremas en lo concerniente a asuntos morales y sociales. Una de las respuestas plausibles es una forma de eclecticismo, que tendría la función de una síntesis fructífera. Este teorema del sentido común guiado críticamente se asienta en concepciones (...) filosóficas clásicas, incluyendo la Escuela de Frankfurt. El ensayo pone como ejemplo principal el tratamiento de las utopías políticas.PLABARAS CLAVEARISTÓTELES, HABERMAS, HEGEL, SENTIDO COMÚN, TEORÍA CRÍTICA, UTOPÍAABSTRACTAn effort to understand the social-political reality could consist in taking a position between opposite poles in the spectrum of ideas. The advantages and disadvantages of placing oneself midway between extreme attitudes concerning moral and social problems have been aknowledged since Greek philosophy. A plausible answer is a form of eclecticism, which could have the function of a fertile synthesis. This theorem of a critically guided common sense is based on classic philosophic conceptions, including the Frankfurt School. This essay sets the analysis of political utopias as a main example.KEY WORDSARISTOTLE, COMMON SENSE, CRITICAL THEORY, UTOPY. (shrink)

The manuscript traditions of Hesiod’s Theogony and Works and Days are well understood, but for the third poem of the Byzantine triad, the pseudo-Hesiodic Scutum, our knowledge remains imperfect. As a contribution to this subject, two neglected manuscripts of the poem are collated. Their relationship to one another is discussed, and their importance to an editor for the constitution of the text is assessed. In addition, new observations are made about the stemma codicum.

The fundamental tenet of contemporary sociobiology, namely the assumption of a single process of evolution involving the selection of genes, is critically examined. An alternative multiple-level, multiple-process model of evolution is presented which posits that the primary process that operates via selection upon the genes cannot account for certain kinds of biological phenomena, especially complex, learned, social behaviours. The primary process has evolved subsidiary evolutionary levels and processes that act to bridge the gap between genes and these complex behaviours. The (...) subsidiary levels are development, individual animal learning, and socioculture itself. It is argued that individual learning is pivotal to the derivation and biological analysis of culture. The differences between cultural and noncultural societies are stressed. It is concluded that such a multiple-level model of evolution can form the basis for reconciling opposing sides in the sociobiology debate. (shrink)